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COMMENTARY
Searching for theneural causesof criminal behavior
Ralph Adolphsa,b,1, Jan Gläscherc, and Daniel Traneld,e
All behavior is proximally caused by the brain, but the
neural causes of most complex behaviors are still not un-
derstood. Much of our ignorance stems from the fact that
complex behavior depends on distributed neural control.
Unlike a reflex, where the arc from sensation to action can
be traced through a few synapses, most volitional behav-
ior involves a dense causal web through which stimuli,
memories, beliefs, and other factors exert their effects.
Disruption anywhere in this causal web can produce ef-
fects that are difficult to trace back to their origin. Against
this background, the finding that focal lesions of the ven-
tromedial prefrontal cortex could lead to immoral and
even criminal behavior generated considerable surprise
and interest (1, 2). While a number of rare cases have now
been described in whom a focal lesion caused criminal-
ity, these are neither very consistent (the lesions occur
in several different anatomical locations) nor at all reli-
able (only a small fraction of patients, for any lesion
location, show criminal behavior). To explain the effects
of a lesion on criminal behavior, we need to understand
what it is that the lesion does to the rest of the brain, a
network-level understanding of lesion effects now pro-
vided by the new study of Darby et al. in PNAS (3).
A Disconnection Approach
Darby et al. (3) began by searching the literature for
cases documenting criminal behavior following a focal
brain lesion. They found 17 of these, with lesions pre-
dominantly including the prefrontal cortex but also other
regions. To estimate the distal effects of such brain
damage, lesion network mapping (4) was used, showing
which other brain regions, in healthy brains, would nor-
mally be functionally connected with the location of the
lesion. This approach effectively treats the brain of the
lesion patient as equivalent to a healthy brain in which all
those regions functionally connected to the lesion site
have been instantaneously affected. To do this, Darby
et al. (3) leveraged a large reference dataset of resting-
state functional MRI (fMRI) data from healthy individuals
[from the Brain Genomics Superstruct Project (5)]. From
each lesion patient amapwas produced showing where,
in this resting-state dataset of healthy individuals, the
lesion site had strong functional connectivity. Maps of
these functionally connected regions were then over-
lapped across the patients, producing a composite map
showing all of the places in a healthy brain that were
predicted to be impacted by the lesions. This innovative
approach (4, 6) takes seriously the notion of a discon-
nection syndrome, a term popularized by Norman
Geschwind (7) in the 1960s: it is the idea that behav-
ioral impairments can be caused by the disruption of
the connections between brain regions rather than by
damage to one particular region itself.
The composite connectivity map based on positive
correlations in the resting-state dataset in fact in-
cluded many of the regions that, when themselves
lesioned, were associated with criminality: the ven-
tromedial and orbital prefrontal cortex, as well as the
anterior temporal lobes. In contrast, the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex was negatively functionally connected
with the lesions. This pattern of functional connectivity
was not seen for 63 other lesions (none of which had any
effect on criminality). But it overlappedwith brain regions
found in task fMRI studies to be activated when healthy
participants were confronted with personal moral di-
lemmas involving harm to another person. Finally, Darby
et al. (3) took care to replicate their findings in an
independent sample of 23 patients whose lesions
were also implicated in criminal behavior, but where the
temporal association between the lesion and changes
in behavior was uncertain. Taken together, and in the
context of prior lesion (2) and activation studies (8–10) of
moral and criminal behavior, the results (3) offer a very
intriguing addition not only to the list of brain regions in
which damage can alter behavior related to criminality,
but also to the mechanisms by which they do so.
Reorganization and Individual Differences
However, there are several serious limitations to the
work, as Darby et al. (3) are careful to discuss in their
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paper. First and foremost among these is the lack of any functional
imaging in the lesion patients themselves. All of the inferences
about distal functional effects of the lesion are derived from as-
sumptions based on functional connectivity in a database of
healthy brains. However, it is well known that functional connec-
tivity changes in psychiatric and neurological disorders (11, 12),
and it would seem likely that there are substantial changes in the
functional connectome of the lesion patients, especially given that
reorganization and compensation will no doubt play a role. Even
instantaneous changes in brain networks are likely to be consid-
erably more complex than can be revealed with the resting-state
connectivity approach taken in the present paper (3). For example,
acute pharmacological inactivation of the amygdala in monkeys
causes dramatic changes in network architecture that include
changes in functional connectivity between distal brain regions (13).
Perhaps most worrisome is the neglect of individual differ-
ences. Not only will there be premorbid individual differences in
personality and other variables that interact with the effect of a
lesion, but (probably in good part due to this) there is also the fact
that most patients who have a lesion in one of the regions impli-
cated by Darby et al.’s (3) analyses (as causally linked to criminal
behavior) do not exhibit criminal behavior. It would be of the utmost
importance to obtain resting-state fMRI data in criminal lesion cases,
such as those described by Darby et al., because it is known that
individual functional connectomes not only differ from one another,
but also from a group average, such as the one used in their study
(14). The most valuable comparisons would then be with two other
datasets: with the same individual, but before the lesion (notoriously
difficult to obtain since the lesions are generally unpredictable acci-
dents of nature); and with other lesion patients who have damage in
the same region, but don’t show criminal behavior. Understanding
the risks, mechanisms, and potential for brain-targeted treatments of
criminal behavior will certainly require attention to single individuals,
a trend now followed by much of neuroimaging (15).
Moral Responsibility and Free Will
The Darby et al. study (3) offers the valuable hypothesis of a
network of core regions that are most closely associated with
criminal behavior (the set revealed by the lesion network map-
ping). But what exactly is criminal behavior, conceived in terms of
cognitive processes? Darby et al. probe this issue by examining
the overlap of these core criminality-associated regions with brain
regions inferred from functional imaging data to subserve pro-
cesses that might well come into play during criminal behavior.
Indeed, overlap was found with brain regions known to be im-
portant for theory of mind and value-based decision-making, a
finding also consistent with prior studies showing deficits in these
abilities in patients whose lesions overlap with the ones in the
present study (16). Howmuch this partial decomposition begins to
explain criminality, however, seems still very much open to
question because, again, the vast majority of patients with im-
pairments in theory of mind or value-based decision-making are
not criminals. In a way this is good news for folk psychology and
jurisprudence: our concepts of moral responsibility and free will
are not challenged by these data, since neither the brain lesions
nor the lesion network maps explain criminality (17).
Presumably this is so because the many other ingredients that
need to come into play refer to factors outside the brain. Genes,
upbringing, provocation, alcohol and drugs, and other factors that
cause momentary emotions and lapses in control, are all going to
act through the brain but may not be easily mapped onto the
brain. Only by gaining a firm handle on these other factors can we
understand the substrate on which a focal brain lesion could cause
criminal behavior.
This fact is particularly important because laypeople and the
media alike continually search for objective explanations of
criminal behavior, when in fact criminality is highly relative to
particular laws and the interpretation of behaviors in a specific
context. In a supplemental table to the Darby et al. study (3), the
authors list the examples of criminality that they included, some of
which are not obviously so (lying, theft, fraud), and some of which
go in the opposite direction (in two patients the lesion caused the
cessation of prelesion criminal behavior). A premeditated white-
collar crime and a murder committed in blind fury may have few
psychological features in common, making it more fruitful to treat
them as separate behaviors to try to understand, than as aspects
of a single very heterogeneous category we should attempt to
investigate. A more precise operationalization of criminality, and a
much better understanding of its psychological causes, are likely
to be a prerequisite for understanding the neurological causes.
Acknowledgments
The authors were supported by National Institute of Mental Health Grant
2P50MH094258.
1 Damasio H, Grabowski T, Frank R, Galaburda AM, Damasio AR (1994) The return of Phineas Gage: Clues about the brain from the skull of a famous patient.
Science 264:1102–1105.
2 Anderson SW, Bechara A, Damasio H, Tranel D, Damasio AR (1999) Impairment of social and moral behavior related to early damage in human prefrontal cortex.
Nat Neurosci 2:1032–1037.
3 Darby RR, Horn A, Cushman F, Fox MD (2018) Lesion network localization of criminal behavior. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 115:601–606.
4 Boes AD, et al. (2015) Network localization of neurological symptoms from focal brain lesions. Brain 138:3061–3075.
5 Holmes AJ, et al. (2015) Brain Genomics Superstruct Project initial data release with structural, functional, and behavioral measures. Sci Data 2:150031.
6 Sutterer MJ, et al. (2016) Canceled connections: Lesion-derived network mapping helps explain differences in performance on a complex decision-making task.
Cortex 78:31–43.
7 Geschwind N (1965) Disconnexion syndromes in animals and man. I. Brain 88:237–294.
8 Greene JD, Nystrom LE, Engell AD, Darley JM, Cohen JD (2004) The neural bases of cognitive conflict and control in moral judgment. Neuron 44:389–400.
9 Greene JD, Sommerville RB, Nystrom LE, Darley JM, Cohen JD (2001) An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgment. Science 293:2105–2108.
10 Moll J, Zahn R, de Oliveira-Souza R, Krueger F, Grafman J (2005) Opinion: The neural basis of human moral cognition. Nat Rev Neurosci 6:799–809.
11 Greicius M (2008) Resting-state functional connectivity in neuropsychiatric disorders. Curr Opin Neurol 21:424–430.
12 Greicius MD, Kimmel DL (2012) Neuroimaging insights into network-based neurodegeneration. Curr Opin Neurol 25:727–734.
13 Grayson DS, et al. (2016) The Rhesus monkey connectome predicts disrupted functional networks resulting from pharmacogenetic inactivation of the amygdala.
Neuron 91:453–466.
14 Gordon EM, et al. (2017) Precision functional mapping of individual human brains. Neuron 95:791–807.e7.
15 Dubois J, Adolphs R (2016) Building a science of individual differences from fMRI. Trends Cogn Sci 20:425–443.
16 Bechara A, Damasio H, Damasio AR (2000) Emotion, decision making and the orbitofrontal cortex. Cereb Cortex 10:295–307.
17 Roskies A (2006) Neuroscientific challenges to free will and responsibility. Trends Cogn Sci 10:419–423.
452 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1720442115 Adolphs et al.
